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Abstract
Increases in international economic integration can lead to greater specialization accord-
ing to comparative advantage, but also to the diﬀusion of skill-biased technologies. In de-
veloping countries characterized by relative abundance of unskilled labor, these factors can
have opposite eﬀects on the relative demand for skilled labor. This paper investigates the
impact of the use of imported inputs, exports and foreign direct investment on the demand
for skilled workers of Brazilian and Chinese manufacturing plants. We ﬁnd that while in
Brazil increased levels of international integration are associated with an increased demand
for skilled labor, the opposite is true in China.
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Among the hypotheses that have been proposed for explaining the increase in earnings diﬀeren-
tials between skilled and unskilled workers observed in the United States during the 1980s, two
have received outmost attention: the increase in trade with developing countries and skill-biased
technological change. The ﬁrst hypothesis postulates that during this period industrialized
countries witnessed considerable increases in imports of unskilled-labor-intensive manufacturing
products from developing countries which were liberalizing their trade regimes and facilitating
foreign direct investment (FDI).1 The second hypothesis relates the increase in the demand for
skilled workers to the intensiﬁcation of the use of computers and related technologies that are
relative complements to skilled labor.2
From the point of view of developing countries, the hypothesis that globalization has caused
an increase in specialization according to comparative advantage should lead to an eﬀect that
is opposite to that observed in industrialized countries. Indeed, according to traditional trade
theory, in developing countries a greater participation in international markets should be asso-
ciated with the exploitation of comparative advantage in goods that are intensive in unskilled
labor. This should cause a shift in demand towards this type of workers, and lead to a reduction
i nt h ew a g ed i ﬀerential with respect to their skilled counterparts. However, in the context of the
second hypothesis highlighted above, the same international economic activities that are often
associated with the exploitation of comparative advantage — the use of imported inputs, exports
and FDI — could also act as channels for the international diﬀusion of skill-biased technologies
developed in industrialized countries, which in principle could diminish or even compensate for
the shifts in labor demand caused by increased specialization. Thus, while in industrialized
countries the labor demand eﬀects of greater international integration and those of skill-biased
1 See Wood (1994).
2 See Berman et al. (1994) and Autor et al. (1998).
1technological change can be safely assumed to reinforce each other, in developing countries both
factors probably operate in opposite directions and empirical evidence is crucial to determine
which tends to prevail. This paper provides new evidence on that question, by estimating the
net eﬀect of the use of imported inputs, exports and FDI on the relative demand for skilled
workers, using recently collected manufacturing plant-level data from Brazil and China, two
developing countries which have experienced signiﬁcant increases in their degree of international
integration.
Previous empirical work on the U.S. and other OECD countries has generally found skilled-
biased technological change to be more important than trade as the main factor underlying the
aforementioned labor demand shifts. Thus, only a small share of the observed changes in the
demand for skilled labor can be attributed to a reallocation of production towards skill-intensive
sectors — as the trade hypothesis would predict. Rather, it appears that most of the shift away
from unskilled labor has taken place within narrowly deﬁned industries, a result that is consistent
with the hypothesis of skill-biased technical change. Moreover, studies using industry-level and
plant-level data have found a direct link between the relative demand for skilled workers and
investments in the adoption of computers or in research and development (R&D).3 However,
these studies have been less successful in uncovering the hypothesized eﬀects of exports, imports
and foreign investment ﬂows on the demand for skilled labor.4
The evidence for developing countries is more scarce. In Mexico, the relative wages of
skilled workers increased dramatically after the country liberalized its trade regime and relaxed
restrictions on FDI in the early 1980s. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) show that the states and
3 See Berman et al. (1994), Doms et al. (1997), Dunne et al. (1997), Autor et al. (1998), Machin and Van
Reenen (1998), and Haskel and Heden (1999).
4 For U.S. industries, some conﬂicting evidence is obtained. Slaughter (2000) and Bloningen and Slaughter (2001)
ﬁnd no important eﬀects of, respectively, outward and inward FDI on the demand for skilled labor. Feenstra
and Hanson (1996a) encounter a signiﬁcant link between outsourcing (encompassing imports and contract work
overseas) and the demand for skilled labor but Autor et al. (1998) obtain non-signiﬁcant eﬀects of imports and
outsourcing and positive eﬀects of exports on skill upgrading.
2industries which received more FDI exhibit a greater demand for skilled labor, a ﬁnding that they
interpret as consistent with a model in which production outsourcing from an industrialized to a
developing country raises the demand for skilled labor in both countries.5 Using plant-level data
for the 1980s, Harrison and Hanson (1999) ﬁnd that Mexican exporters and foreign-owned plants
tend to employ a higher share of skilled workers, and so do plants that use more imported inputs
and machinery. Pavcnik (2003) analyses panel data on Chilean manufacturing plants during the
1980s and ﬁnds that the use of imported materials, patented technology and foreign technical
assistance appear to be unrelated to the demand for skilled labor in ﬁxed eﬀects and time-
diﬀerenced regressions. However, she reports positive eﬀects of those three variables on skilled
demand when using the cross-sectional variation in the data, which she interprets as reﬂecting
unobserved plant heterogeneity driven, for example, by diﬀerent degrees of managerial ability
which aﬀect both the adoption of foreign technology and the demand for skilled labor.6
This paper obtains new plant-level evidence from Brazil and China on the eﬀect of inter-
national economic activities on the demand for skilled labor. As Harrison and Hanson (1999),
we focus on the cross-sectional variation in the demand for skilled workers, and provide sepa-
rate estimates on the eﬀects of the use of imported inputs, exports and FDI on relative wages
and relative employment.7 In order to account for the unobserved eﬀects of managerial abil-
5 In the model proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996b), a single ﬁnal good is produced with a continuum of
intermediate inputs, which are traded between two countries, “North” and “South”, with relative abundance of
skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. The North specializes in inputs that are relatively intensive in skilled
labor while the reverse is true for the South. A ﬂow of capital from North to South leads to a shift of production
activities to the South. Those activities are relatively intensive in unskilled labor by Northern standards, but
they use more skilled labor than other inputs previously produced in the South, so that the relative wage of
skilled labor increases in both countries.
6 Gorg and Strobl (2001) use panel data on Ghanaian manufacturing plants to estimate the eﬀect of exports and
the use of imported machinery on the demand for skilled workers. They ﬁnd that the latter is unrelated to exports,
but positively linked to the use of imported machinery that was purchased for the purpose of technological
progress.
7 Note that Harrison and Hanson (1999) use a panel dataset of Mexican manufacturing plants but most of their
relative wage and relative employment regressions are estimated by OLS in levels. The only exception is a
speciﬁcation including only trade policy variables (tariﬀs and import licenses without any other controls) that is
also estimated in diﬀerences. The justiﬁcation for their approach is "the very little time series variation in many
of the other independent variables" (p. 146).
3ity highlighted by Pavcnik (2003), we control for the managers’ level of education, as well as
for the presence of research and development (R&D) activities and the introduction of new
product lines. Furthermore, we show that our results are robust to a series of tests, including
instrumental variables estimation, and estimation that allows for potentially diﬀerent eﬀects of
international activities on plants pertaining to industries with revealed comparative advantage,
and on private and state-owned plants (in the case of China).
Intermediate inputs are thought to act as a channel for the international diﬀu s i o no ft e c h -
nology, provided that they embody state-of-the-art technologies not available domestically.8
Moreover, in their contacts with foreign suppliers importers may gain access to tacit, non-codiﬁed
forms of knowledge, which are not transferable by means of market transactions.9 However, as
argued above, one could also expect that within a given industry, those ﬁrms that make a greater
use of imported inputs also choose to concentrate in the stages of the production process in which
the country has comparative advantage. For instance, ﬁrms located in export-processing zones
tend to import skill-intensive intermediate inputs and concentrate on unskilled-labor-intensive
assembly operations.
The second international activity on which we focus is exporting. As in the case of importers,
one can also argue that in a country with relative abundance of unskilled labor, within a given
industry, exporters are more likely to “play to their strengths” and thus specialize in goods or
stages of the production process that make a more intensive use of unskilled labor. On the
other hand, exporters may be pressured by their foreign clients to produce according to quality
standards that are higher than those prevailing in the domestic market, and they may also gain
8 See, for instance, the models of trade and endogenous growth in Grossman and Helpman (1991).
9 Keller (2004) notes that although the use of imported inputs may give rise to international spillovers associated
with the fact that they cost less than their opportunity costs — including the R&D cost of development — only
the manufactured outcome of the technology, and not the technology as such, becomes available in the importing
country, which makes this a “weak form of technology diﬀusion”. The spillovers should be greater for imports
from countries with larger R&D stocks, which has been to some extent conﬁrmed in empirical studies (e.g., Coe
et al., 1997; Xu and Wang, 1999; and Lumenga-Neso et al., 2001).
4access to tacit information or even proprietary knowledge provided by their clients in order to
help them meet those standards.10 Thus, exporting may also act as a channel for international
technology diﬀusion and, to the extent that the absorbed technology is biased towards skilled
labor, ﬁrms engaging in exporting activities could exhibit a greater demand for skilled workers,
provided that this eﬀect is not compensated by a greater degree of specialization according to
comparative advantage.
In the case of FDI, the third activity which we consider, international technology diﬀusion
can be expected to take place primarily through the sharing of ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology among
multinational parents and subsidiaries.11 In fact, the existence of knowledge-based ﬁrm-speciﬁc
assets and the intrinsic diﬃculties associated with their market-mediated transfer — for instance
through technology licensing — are factors that have been featured prominently in theories that
attempt to explain the very existence of multinational enterprises.12 A third factor that is often
mentioned in order to explain the occurrence of FDI is the existence of location advantages in
the host country. These advantages can be of two types: on the one hand, high transport costs
or tariﬀ barriers are normally linked to the use of “horizontal” FDI as a substitute for exports,
as means for reaching the markets of suﬃciently large countries. On the other hand, when
factor prices diﬀer across countries, location advantages may also be related to the relatively
low costs of unskilled labor or other factors of production, giving rise to the so-called “vertical”
FDI.13 As argued by Keller (2004), the extent of technology transfer to the host country is
probably smaller in the latter type of FDI, which in our developing countries’ context would
imply a smaller impact on the demand for skilled labor. However, as argued by Feenstra and
10See Clerides et al. (1998), Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2002), and Keller (2004).
11It is worth noting that although FDI may lead to technology spillovers that beneﬁt domestic ﬁrms and may




5Hanson (1996b), it is also possible that while the activities transferred through vertical FDI are
unskilled-labor-intensive in the country where the headquarters are located, the aﬃliates’ use of
skilled labor is still higher than that of their domestic counterparts in the host country.
A sm e n t i o n e da b o v e ,i no r d e rt oa c c o u n tf o rt h ee ﬀects of unobserved managerial ability,
which could aﬀect both the decision to engage in international activities and the plants’ de-
mand for skilled labor, we employ variables that measure the managers’ level of education and
proxies for the plants’ learning or absorptive capacity. As argued by Keller (1996), the lack
of a minimum local critical mass of absorptive capacity may explain why some countries that
have become outward-oriented have gained less than others in terms of access to international
technology ﬂows. The absorptive capacity of ﬁrms can be described as their “ability to identify,
assimilate and exploit knowledge from the environment” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, p. 569). It
encompasses both the ability to imitate new process or product innovations, and the capacity to
use outside knowledge as the basis for internal innovative activities. The development of absorp-
tive capacity, Cohen and Levinthal argue, is one of the motivations for ﬁrms to invest in R&D.
In accordance with this approach, we use the presence of R&D activities as an indicator of the
existence of absorptive capacities at the plant level. In addition, in order to capture the learning
capacity accumulated by ﬁrms in the processes of imitation and technology adoption — even if
strictly deﬁned R&D activities are not performed — we also consider the experience associated
with the introduction of new product lines as a component of their absorptive capacity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model used
as a framework and the empirical speciﬁcation. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4
reports regression results. Section 5 discusses robustness checks and Section 6 oﬀers concluding
remarks.
2. Theoretical Model and Empirical Speciﬁcation
6This section presents the theoretical framework used to investigate the eﬀect of diﬀerent
international economic activities on the demand for skilled labor. We assume that manufacturing
plants choose their variable inputs - skilled and unskilled labor - by minimizing a restricted
variable cost function subject to an output constraint. For plant i, the minimum labor cost of
producing value added VA i given its capital stock Ki,w h i c hi saq u a s i - ﬁxed input, its internal
absorptive capacity, T 1
i , and its engagement in an international economic activity, T 2
i ,i sg i v e n
by:14
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i is the wage paid to unskilled workers.15
We use a translog functional form for logarithmic variable costs as in Berman et al. (1994):
lnVC i = β0 + βS lnw
S
i + βU lnw
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Diﬀerentiating the cost function with respect to lnw S
i , using Shephard’s lemma and making
the assumptions of (i) symmetry of the eﬀect of relative input prices on input demands and (ii)
14For simplicity, we ignore the plant’s choice of intermediate inputs. Hence, output is measured by value added
and the plant’s variable costs are simply labor costs.
15For brevity in the exposition, we describe T1
i as a single variable. However in our empirical implementation, T1
i
is a vector of two indicator variables: one for plants doing R&D and another for plants introducing new product
lines. Also, in most speciﬁcations T2
i is a single variable but in Section 4.4, we allow T2
i to be a vector including
multiple international activities.
7homogeneity of degree one in input prices, one obtains the following equation representing the



















The dependent variable in Eq. (3) is the wage bill share of skilled workers. A positive φST1
suggests that the plant’s absorptive capacity is skill biased and a positive φST2 suggests that the
international economic activity that the plant is engaged in is skill biased. Finally, a positive
φSK indicates that capital and skilled labor are complementary. Constant returns to scale would
be veriﬁed if φSK = −φSV. However, we do not impose constant returns to scale in our speci-
ﬁcations. Instead, we modify the way in which capital and value added enter the equation and
estimate directly a parameter representing returns to scale.17 To obtain an estimable equation,
we add a stochastic error εi to Eq. (3) representing e.g., measurement or optimization error.

















i + εi. (4)
The estimation of Eq. (4) is subject to an econometric problem: the diﬃculty in identifying
the eﬀect of relative wages on the demand for skilled labor. The cross-sectional variation in
relative wages is generally not exogenous (i.e., due to variation in actual prices of labor) but
instead is often due to variation in the unobserved quality of labor. This problem could be
addressed by instrumental variables estimation, if instruments for the relative wage term were
available. Following Berman et al. (1994), most researchers have estimated variants of Eq.
16Shephard’s lemma states that the derivative of the restricted cost function with respect to input X’s price
equals input X’s demand. If X is skilled labor, the lemma states that dV C
dwS = LS. Multiplying and dividing this
equality by wS
VC, an elasticity expression is obtained: dV C
dwS ∗ wS
VC = wSLS
VC . For our case of logarithmic variable
costs, the following equality holds: dlnVC
dlnwS = dV C
dwS ∗ wS
VC = wSLS
VC . The assumption of symmetry of the eﬀect of
relative input prices on input demands implies φSU = φUS. The assumption of homogeneity of degree one in
input prices implies φSU = −φSS.
17The expression φSK lnKi + φSV lnVA i in Eq. (3) is rewritten as β2 ln(
Ki
VA i)+β3 lnVA i in Eq. (4) with
β2 = φSK and β3 = φSK + φSV. Returns to scale are given by β3.
8(4) dropping the relative wage term.18 We also focus on estimation results that exclude the
relative wage term, but we include industry and region dummy variables which may correct for
diﬀerences in the excluded term and correct for other systematic diﬀerences in the demand for
skilled workers across industries and regions.
Better plant managers are more likely to engage in international economic activities (e.g., by
being more able to attract foreign investment), have more absorptive capacity to use advanced
technologies but they also may choose more skilled workers. Omitting manager quality from the
estimation could lead to a correlation between the error term in Eq. (4) and variables T 1
i and T 2
i
and hence an upward bias in the main coeﬃcients of interest. To address this potential bias, we
include a proxy for managerial quality, MQi, in the regressions. Our ﬁnal estimable equation
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r + εijr. (5)
We also consider speciﬁcations where the dependent variable is the share of skilled workers in
total employment instead of their share in the wage bill, although these are not directly derived
from the theoretical framework.
3. Data and Cross Tabulation Results
3.1 Data
In Table 1, we present some major economic facts for the countries analyzed in this paper,
Brazil and China. While the per capita income level in Brazil is almost three times that in
China, the average level of education of the population is higher in China. Over the 1990s, China
achieved a greater degree of openness than Brazil, reﬂe c t e di nG D Ps h a r e so fe x p o r t s ,i m p o r t s
and FDI that were twice as large on average in China. However, both countries experienced
18See, for example, Autor et al. (1998), Machin and Van Reenen (1998), Haskel and Heden (1999), and Slaughter
(2000). When using panel data, researchers have argued that time dummies can account for the variation in
relative wages.
9an increase in international integration with e.g., exports growing much faster than income,
making it interesting to analyze the link between international activities and the demand for
skilled labor.
Our analysis draws on survey data recently collected by the World Bank from manufacturing
establishments in Brazil and China under the Investment Climate Assessment initiative.19 The
surveys applied a (mostly) common questionnaire covering a variety of topics (e.g., infrastruc-
ture, ﬁnance, etc.) to random samples of establishments and were implemented in China in 2001
in partnership with a local statistical institute and in Brazil in 2003 in partnership with a local
consulting ﬁrm.20 The random samples were drawn from a sampling frame of manufacturing
establishments in each country. The sample design varied by country: (i) in Brazil, stratiﬁed
samples based on industry-state-size were drawn for thirteen states and all the regressions esti-
mated in the paper are weighted accordingly and (ii) in China, the sample was randomly chosen
for each of ﬁve cities.21
Both surveys cover diﬀerent industries and regions and the entire range of plant sizes, but
the exact composition of the samples diﬀers across countries. In Table 2, we show the distrib-
ution of plants across industries (Panel A) and across size groups (Panel B) for each country.22
The apparel, auto-parts and electronics industries are covered in both countries. Large plants
represent about a half of the sample for Brazil whereas for China the majority of plants in the
sample are small.
19More information on the initiative can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/.
20The survey questionnaires also included some country speciﬁc questions. For our purposes, the relevant survey
questions relate to the workforce, technology and innovation, production and costs, ownership structure, trade
and manager characteristics.
21In Brazil, the sampling frame consisted of the listings of manufacturing establishments provided by IBGE (the
national statistical oﬃce). The states covered in Brazil are: Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Goiás, Maranhão, Mato
Grosso, Minas Gerais, Paraíba, Paraná, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and São Paulo. In
China, the sampling frame consisted of an electronic list of ﬁrms in each of the cities covered: Beijing, Chengdu,
Guangzhou, Shanghai and Tianjin.
22Size groups are deﬁned according to a plant’s total number of permanent employees.
103.1.1 Skills Measures
Measures of skills are needed to construct the dependent variables in the regressions: wage
bill shares and employment shares of skilled workers. Our surveys provide information on
employment, wages and the average number of years of education for ﬁve types of workers
(management, professionals, skilled production workers, unskilled production workers and other
nonproduction workers).23 We consider total compensation i.e., wages and salaries plus bonuses
and other beneﬁts as the measure of wages. Our ﬁrst measure of skilled workers is based
on occupation: nonproduction workers deﬁned as the sum of management, professionals and
nonproduction workers.24 Most previous studies use datasets for which the skilled/unskilled
workers distinction can be proxied only by this nonproduction/production worker distinction.
However, this is imperfect since, for example, some of the nonproduction workers are in fact
engaged in low skilled tasks. Our second measure of skilled workers is also based on occupation
but improves upon the nonproduction/production worker distinction: workers in managerial,
engineering and technical occupations, deﬁned as the sum of management and professionals.25
This measure excludes the type of workers called in our surveys other nonproduction workers i.e.,
those that are not directly involved in production but that are neither part of management nor
classiﬁed as professionals.26 Our third measure of skilled workers is based on education: workers
with at least some college education.27 For China, we use information on average educational
levels for each type of workers. Skilled worker wage bill shares (employment shares) are deﬁned
23A detailed deﬁnition of these ﬁve types of workers is available from the authors upon request. In the Chinese
survey, some of the worker types have diﬀerent labels (professionals are called engineering and technical person-
nel, skilled production workers are called basic production workers and unskilled production workers are called
auxiliary production workers) and some worker types are actually diﬀerent but can be mapped into these ﬁve
worker types (service personnel and other employees are mapped into other nonproduction workers).
24In this case, unskilled workers are production workers deﬁned as the sum of skilled production workers and
unskilled production workers.
25In this case, unskilled workers are deﬁned to be the sum of skilled production workers, unskilled production
workers and other nonproduction workers.
26An example of such workers would be janitors.
27In this case, unskilled workers are deﬁned as workers that have completed secondary education or less.
11as the sum of wages (number of workers) of all types of workers which have an average number
of years of education strictly larger than the number of years needed to complete secondary
school divided by the total wage bill (total number of employees).28 For Brazil, we use direct
information on the percentage of workers with some college education.29
In Table 3 Panel A, we present summary statistics on wage bill shares and employment
shares of skilled workers according to our three measures. In both countries, wage bill shares
and employment shares of nonproduction workers are larger than those of workers in engineering,
technical and managerial occupations (by deﬁnition) and these are in turn larger than those of
workers with college education. For any given deﬁnition of skills, average wage bill shares are
larger than average employment shares. According to all skills measures, Brazil has lower average
shares of skilled workers than China.
3.1.2 Absorptive Capacity and International Economic Activities
As measures of plants’ learning and absorptive capacities, we use a dummy variable for R&D
expenditures and a dummy variable for the introduction of new product lines.30 To measure the
presence of international economic activities, we use a dummy variable for plants that export,
the plant’s share of sales that are exported, a dummy variable for plants that are foreign-owned,
the plant’s foreign ownership share, a dummy variable for plants that use imported inputs and
the plant’s imported inputs share. For Brazil, we use data on direct exports, i.e. those not done
through a distributor, whereas for China we use data on total exports since the survey does not
distinguish between direct and indirect exports.31 In Table 3 Panel B, summary statistics are
shown for the diﬀerent measures of absorptive capacity and international economic activities.
28The implicit assumption made in constructing this measure is that all workers of a given type have exactly the
average level of education of that worker type.
29Wage bill shares for this education-based measure of skills are not available for Brazil.
30R&D and the introduction of new product lines can be viewed as, respectively, an input into and an output
from a knowledge production function (see Chennells and Van Reenen, 1999).
31However, the empirical ﬁndings for Brazil are very similar when considering total exports.
123.1.3 Other Variables
Estimating Eq. (5) also requires the use of plant-level data on sales and materials costs to
construct value added, the book value of machinery and equipment to measure the capital stock,
industry and region dummy variables. To reduce the inﬂuence of extreme values, we eliminate
from the estimation the top and bottom 1% of observations for the ratio of capital to value
added in each industry.32 The industry dummy variables are based on the industries shown
in Table 2.33 The region dummy variables represent thirteen states in Brazil and ﬁve cities in
China. Finally, we rely on information on the plant’s main manager level of education as a
proxy for manager quality using three dummy variables: managers with secondary education,
managers with college education and managers with graduate education.
3.2. Cross-Tabulation Results
The results from cross-tabulations between the wage bill shares of diﬀerent measures of
skilled labor and either measures of absorptive capacity or international economic activities
are presented in Table 4 for Brazil (Panel A) and China (Panel B).34 For each country, we
calculate the diﬀerence between the average wage bill share of skilled workers for (i) plants with
"better" absorptive capacity or (ii) plants "more" engaged in international economic activities
and the average wage bill share of skilled workers for other plants and we test whether those
diﬀerences in averages are statistically signiﬁcant.35 In Brazil, there is a positive and signiﬁcant
correlation between the wage bill share of skilled workers and both measures of absorptive
capacity and international activities, however skills are measured. In China, the measures
of absorptive capacity and FDI are also positively and signiﬁcantly associated with wage bill
32As industries diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their capital intensity, the elimination is done for each industry separately.
33All the empirical results obtained for Brazil and China described in Section 4 are maintained considering
industry dummy variables at a more disaggregated level: 4-digit ISIC revision 3.
34For Brazil, Table 4 shows employment shares of workers with college education instead of the corresponding
wage bill shares which are unavailable.
35For dummy variables, a plant with "better" absorptive capacity or "more" engaged in international economic
activities has the corresponding dummy variable equal to one.
13shares of skilled workers. For two out of three skills deﬁnitions, exports are negatively and
signiﬁcantly associated with wage bill shares of skilled workers while imported inputs exhibit
an o n - s i g n i ﬁcant correlation with the demand for skilled labor for two out of three measures
of skilled labor. These cross-tabulations point out to important diﬀerences in wage bill shares
depending on the international economic activities that plants are engaged in and depending on
the country under analysis which are interesting to pursue in a regression framework.
4. Regression Results
In this section, we discuss the results from estimating Eq. (5) separately for each country
by ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors corrected for possible heteroskedasticity
(White correction) and weighted by survey weights for Brazil.36 We present the results in Tables
5 through 12 organized by international economic activity. In each table, the columns represent
the dependent variables in the regressions (wage bill shares and employment shares of skilled
workers) and the rows show the coeﬃcients and standard errors of absorptive capacity measures
and international economic activities, the R-squared and the number of observations in each
regression.
4.1. Imported Inputs
Table 5 presents regression results for the estimation of Eq. (5) including as the international
economic activity a dummy variable for plants that use imported intermediate inputs. In the case
of Brazil, that dummy has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on wage bill shares and employment
shares of skilled workers, regardless of the skilled labor deﬁnition. Quantitatively, the magnitude
of the eﬀects is largest for the employment share of workers with college education, which
increases by about 36% for plants that use imported inputs, and is lowest for the employment
36We also estimate Eq. (5) for Brazil using unweighted OLS to test whether or not sample weights should be
used following Deaton (1997), p. 72. We conclude that sample weights have to be used in the estimation.
14share of nonproduction workers, which increases by about 12% for those plants (the average
eﬀect, across the ﬁve diﬀerent measures of skills is 19%).37 When expressed as elasticities,
the eﬀects are somewhat smaller on employment shares when compared to wage bill shares,
suggesting that the relative wages of skilled workers may be slightly larger in plants which use
imported inputs, thus reinforcing the eﬀect of the latter on employment.
Very diﬀerent results are obtained for China, where the use of imported inputs has a sig-
niﬁcant negative eﬀect on the employment shares of nonproduction workers and of workers in
engineering, technical and managerial occupations. This suggests that Chinese plants that use
imported inputs concentrate to a larger extent than their competitors in production activities
that are intensive in unskilled labor. The magnitude of these eﬀects is similar to those found
for Brazil, although with the reverse sign: relative to other plants, those that use imported
inputs have employment shares that are 15% lower for nonproduction workers and 8% lower for
workers in engineering, technical and managerial occupations. The ﬁnding that the eﬀects on
the corresponding wage bill shares are negative but not signiﬁcant indicates that while plants
that use imported inputs employ relatively fewer skilled workers, the wages they pay to those
workers are higher than those paid in other plants, as was also found in Brazil.
As an alternative to the use of a dummy variable, and to test the robustness of the results
with that approach, we consider in Table 6 the share of intermediate inputs that are imported as
the international activity. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5. A
higher share of imported inputs is associated with a greater demand for skilled workers in Brazil
and with a lower demand for those workers in China and most of the eﬀects are signiﬁcant.
Although our focus is on the eﬀect of diﬀerent international economic activities on skilled
37These and other elasticities reported below are calculated as the ratio of the coeﬃcient on the relevant dummy
variable to the average of the corresponding skilled labor share in the group of plants for which the dummy
variable is zero: e.g., the ratio of the coeﬃcient on the imported inputs dummy to the average wage bill share of
workers with college education of plants that do not import inputs.
15labor demand, it is worth commenting brieﬂy on the estimated coeﬃcients on the other variables
included in Eq. (5). The variables measuring plants’ absorptive capacity, for instance, are
expected to be positively related with the various measures of skill demand. This is indeed
the case in Brazil and China when the dummy variable for R&D activities is employed, as this
variable has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on all measures of skill demand. The second measure
of absorptive capacity, the dummy variable for plants that introduced in the market a major
new product line during the years preceding the survey, is also found to be positively linked to
skill demand in all speciﬁcations for Brazil and China. However, in Brazil it is signiﬁcant only
when employment shares are used as left-hand-side variables, suggesting a compensating eﬀect
on the relative wages of skilled workers. In China, the introduction of new product lines has
signiﬁcant eﬀects only for the skills measures based on workers in engineering, technical and
managerial occupations.
Although the corresponding coeﬃcients are not reported in the tables, all regressions include
the capital to value added ratio, value added, and dummy variables measuring the level of educa-
tion of the plant’s general manager.38 The results for the ﬁrst two variables can be summarized
as follows. The coeﬃcients on the capital to value added ratio are negative in Brazil and China
indicating substitutability between capital and skilled labor. In Brazil, those coeﬃcients are sig-
niﬁcant only when skills are measured based on workers in engineering, technical and managerial
occupations. In China, signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcients are found for all skills measures. The
results for value added are not clear-cut, as the sign of the corresponding coeﬃcients alternates
depending on the measure of skills used. In Brazil, those coeﬃcients are negative and signiﬁcant,
indicating decreasing returns to scale, when the dependent variable is the employment share of
workers in engineering, technical and managerial occupations. However, the opposite result is
38Furthermore, industry and region dummy variables are also included.
16found when the dependent variable is the wage bill share of nonproduction workers. In China,
the coeﬃcients are negative and signiﬁcant for three out of six dependent variables.
The results for the variables representing the level of education of the plants’ general manager
conﬁrm that they are relevant determinants of the demand for skilled workers, although in gen-
eral positive signiﬁcant eﬀects are found only when the manager’s level of education includes at
least some college education and, more frequently, when managers have also completed graduate
studies. Moreover, in Brazil signiﬁcant eﬀects are found only when the employment shares of
college-educated workers or of workers in engineering, technical and managerial occupations are
used as left-hand-side variables. The ﬁndings on the role of the manager’s educational level, on
absorptive capacity, on value added and on the ratio of capital to value added remain generally
unchanged when diﬀerent international economic activities are considered.39
4.2. Exports
In Tables 7 and 8, we report estimates of Eq. (5) when an export dummy or export shares are
the international economic activities considered. In Brazil, we ﬁnd diﬀerent results depending
on whether the export dummy or export shares are used. The results in Table 7 with the export
dummy suggest, to some extent, that exporters demand more skilled workers. Indeed, the wage
bill shares of nonproduction workers and of workers in engineering, technical and managerial
occupations are signiﬁcantly higher among exporting plants. In elasticity terms, the positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the export dummy is larger for the latter (19%) than for the former
group of workers (11%). These ﬁndings could be viewed as evidence of a role of exports in
transmitting skill-biased technology. Note, however, that these results are restricted to wage
bill shares, suggesting that their eﬀect could be working through higher relative wages among
exporters. Also, the results in Table 8 with export shares indicate that plants with higher export
39Hence, for brevity, we will not discuss those eﬀects in the sections that follow.
17shares have lower wage bill shares and lower employment shares of skilled workers. The eﬀects
are signiﬁcant when the dependent variables are employment shares of either nonproduction
workers or workers in engineering, technical and managerial occupations. This would suggest
that, in fact, exporters are specializing in relatively unskilled labor-intensive products according
to their comparative advantage. To gain a better understanding of these disparate results,
we also estimate Eq. (5) including a diﬀerent set of export dummy variables: one for plants
exporting less than 10% of their output, another for plants exporting between 10% and 50% of
their output and a third for plants exporting more than 50% of their output. The results indicate
that plants with export shares up to 50% demand relatively more skilled workers, while plants
exporting a majority of their output demand relatively less skilled workers.40 So, the results
with the export dummy in Table 7 are driven by "minority" exporters whereas the results with
export shares in Table 8 are driven by "majority" exporters.
In China, the results are unambiguous compared to Brazil. We ﬁnd evidence of a negative and
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the export dummy and of export shares on wage bill shares and employment
shares of skilled workers for all skills deﬁnitions.41 Plants that participate in export markets
demand relatively less skilled workers. More speciﬁcally, those plants have wage bill shares of
nonproduction workers that are 50% lower than in nonexporter plants, and have employment
shares of nonproduction workers and wage bill shares and employment shares of workers in
engineering, technical and managerial activities that are more than 30% lower than those in
nonexporter plants. This evidence suggests that Chinese plants are specializing according to
their comparative advantage, in unskilled-labor-intensive activities and this eﬀect more than
compensates for any impact that exporting may have in terms of technology diﬀusion. In
elasticity terms, the eﬀects of the export dummy are larger (more negative) for employment
40These regression results are available from the authors upon request.
41One exception occurs in terms of signiﬁcance for the export dummy when the dependent variable is the wage
bill share of workers with some college.
18shares than for wage bill shares which could indicate that while employment of skilled workers
is lower in exporter plants their wages may be larger in those plants.
4.3. Foreign Ownership
The results for the speciﬁcations that employ a foreign ownership dummy as the plant’s
international economic activity are reported in Table 9. For Brazil and China, the evidence
shows that plants with FDI exhibit a signiﬁcantly larger demand for skilled workers, regardless
of how the latter are deﬁned, the only exception being the regressions with employment shares of
nonproduction workers. The magnitude of these eﬀects is large, particularly in Brazil when the
focus is placed on the demand for workers in engineering, technical and managerial occupations
or on the demand for workers with college education. As an example, for Brazilian plants the
presence of at least some FDI is associated with wage bill shares and employment shares of
workers in engineering, technical and managerial occupations that are respectively 60% and
46% larger than those in their domestic competitors. Similarly, Chinese plants with FDI have
wage bill shares and employment shares of workers with college education that are respectively
38% and 29% larger than those in domestically-owned plants.
In order to test the robustness of these ﬁndings, we report in Table 10 the estimates from
regressions where plants’ FDI shares measure their involvement in international economic ac-
tivities. The results are qualitatively very similar to those obtained with the FDI dummy. In
Brazil, higher FDI shares are associated, in most cases, with a greater demand for skilled labor,
and the same is true for China, although the eﬀects are signiﬁcant for only two of the dependent
variables.
4.4. Multiple International Economic Activities
Our analysis in Sections 4.1-4.3 considers the eﬀect of each international economic activity
19separately on the demand for skilled labor of manufacturing plants in Brazil and China. Kraay
et al. (2001) argue that these various international economic activities are not independent,
rather they are highly interrelated, so focusing on one activity and ignoring the others may
over or underestimate its true eﬀects.42 For this reason, we also estimate our main speciﬁcation
considering simultaneously various international economic activities. Table 11 shows the results
from regressions that include an imported inputs dummy, an FDI dummy and an export dummy.
In Brazil, the estimates indicate that the use of imported inputs, exports and FDI contribute to
a higher demand for skilled labor. The sign and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients are very similar
to those described in Sections 4.1-4.3. This could indicate, as suggested by Kraay et al. (2001),
that the coeﬃcients from the regressions with a single international economic activity pick up
also the eﬀects of the other omitted activities. In China, there is a negative eﬀect of the use of
imported inputs and exports on the demand for skilled labor but a positive eﬀect of FDI on that
demand. Again, these ﬁndings parallel those from the regressions including a single international
activity, and the magnitude of the FDI dummy coeﬃcients is larger in the regressions including
all activities.
Table 12 presents the regression results including imported inputs shares, FDI shares and
export shares to measure international activities. In Brazil, we ﬁnd that higher imported in-
puts shares and FDI shares are linked to a higher demand for skilled labor but higher exports
shares are linked to a lower demand for skilled labor. These ﬁndings are very close to those
in Sections 4.1-4.3 but the estimated coeﬃcients are smaller when all activities are considered
simultaneously. In China, the results suggest that imported inputs shares and exports shares
have a negative eﬀect on wage bill shares and employment shares of skilled workers whereas the
opposite is veriﬁed for FDI shares. Again, these ﬁndings are similar to those from the regressions
42Also, Harrison and Hanson (1999) and Pavcnik (2003) include simultaneously diﬀerent technology and inter-
national integration variables in their regressions.
20with a single international activity. The coeﬃcients on imported inputs and FDI are larger and
those on exports are smaller than those in, respectively, Tables 6, 10 and 8.
5. Robustness
To test the robustness of the results presented in Section 4, we consider diﬀerent empirical
speciﬁcations and estimation techniques.
5.1. Relative Wages and Relative Employment
The aforementioned results using wage bill shares and employment shares of skilled workers
as dependent variables suggest that the use of imported inputs, exports and FDI are associated
with higher relative wages for skilled workers. Indeed, the elasticities of wage bill shares of
skilled workers with respect to those three international activities are generally larger than the
corresponding elasticities for employment shares. In order to better identify the separate eﬀects
of international activities on relative wages and on relative employment of skilled workers, we
now discuss the results from speciﬁcations that use those variables as dependent variables in Eq.
(5).43 We report in Tables 13-15 only the results with imported inputs shares, export shares
and FDI shares as the results with the corresponding dummy variables are qualitatively very
similar.
For Brazil, the estimates conﬁrm that larger shares of imported inputs and larger export
shares are associated with higher relative wages of skilled workers. Foreign ownership, however,
does not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the relative wages of skilled Brazilian workers. For both
imported inputs and FDI, the eﬀects on relative skilled employment are found to be positive
and signiﬁcant, but the eﬀects of exports are negative.44 For China, we ﬁnd that the three afore-
43This approach is followed also by Harrison and Hanson (1999).
44When the eﬀects of exports are allowed to vary by ranges of export shares, we ﬁnd that their negative impact
on the relative employment of skilled workers is restricted to the plants for which exports represent at least 50%
of total sales. However, higher relative wages of skilled workers among exporters are found for all ranges of
export shares.
21mentioned international activities are associated with higher relative wages for skilled workers.
However, the eﬀects on relative skilled employment are negative and signiﬁcant for imported
inputs and export shares and are not signiﬁcant for FDI shares.
5.2. Industries with Comparative Advantage
The eﬀect of international economic activities on the demand for skilled labor may depend on
whether or not the plant belongs to an industry with comparative advantage. We follow Yeats
(1998) in calculating revealed comparative advantage indexes for each 4-digit ISIC revision 3
industry in Brazil (for 2001) and in China (for 1999) and based on these indexes, we construct
dummy variables identifying the industries with comparative advantage in each country.45 We
estimate a modiﬁed version of Eq. (5), where the international activity T 2
ijr enters separately and
interacted with the dummy variable for comparative advantage industries and show the results
in Tables 16-18.46 In Table 16, the coeﬃcients on imported inputs shares for Brazil are positive
and close to those in Table 6. The coeﬃcients on the interaction with the comparative advantage
dummy are negative in three cases but never signiﬁcant. The total eﬀect of imported inputs on
the demand for skilled labor is positive suggesting that our earlier ﬁnding that imported inputs
allow Brazilian plants access to skill-biased technology ﬂows is not counteracted by the fact that
plants importing inputs in comparative advantage industries may be engaging in production
activities intensive in unskilled labor. For China, the eﬀect of imported inputs shares per se on
the demand for skilled labor is negative, except for education-based skills measures. Chinese
plants that import higher shares of inputs in industries with comparative advantage have an even
lower demand for skilled workers. This provides support to our interpretation of the negative
45We use detailed trade ﬂows for Brazil, China and the world taken from World Integrated Trade Solution
(WITS) to compute the revealed comparative advantage indexes as detailed in Yeats (1998). Industries with
values for those indexes larger than one have revealed comparative advantage.
46The results with imported inputs shares, export shares and FDI shares are qualitatively similar to those with
the corresponding dummy variables, hence we discuss here only the results with shares.
22eﬀect of imported inputs on skill demand of Chinese plants as being driven by their specialization
according to comparative advantage.
In Table 17, we ﬁnd that Brazilian plants with higher export shares have higher wage bill
shares but signiﬁcantly lower employment shares of skilled workers. In industries with com-
parative advantage, the eﬀect of exports on the wage bill shares of skilled workers is generally
counteracted, thus becoming negative in those industries. Thus, the total eﬀect of exports is
negative for all skills measures in industries with comparative advantage. In the remaining
industries that eﬀect is negative only in the speciﬁcations that use employment shares as de-
pendent variables. The results are positive and not signiﬁcant when wage bill shares are used,
possibly due to the positive eﬀect of exports on relative wages reported in the previous section.
For China, the coeﬃcients on export shares are negative and generally signiﬁcant. In industries
with comparative advantage, exporting plants have a much lower demand for skilled workers
than other plants. This ﬁnding is consistent with that obtained for imported inputs shares and
suggests that plants in industries with comparative advantage specialize to a greater extent in
the production of goods intensive in the use of unskilled labor.
Table 18 shows that Brazilian plants with larger FDI shares demand relatively more skilled
workers and the eﬀects are very similar to those in Table 10. The coeﬃcients on the interaction
term are generally positive, although not signiﬁcant. Hence, in Brazil, foreign ownership plays
a role in transferring skill-biased technology in all industries, including those with comparative
advantage. In China, the coeﬃcients on FDI shares are positive and signiﬁcant and larger in
magnitude that those in Table 10. The coeﬃcients on the interaction term are negative but
the overall eﬀect of FDI on the demand for skilled labor of plants in industries with revealed
comparative advantage is still positive, indicating that the role of FDI in diﬀusing technology
is only partly counteracted by a specialization of Chinese plants in the production of goods
23intensive in unskilled labor.
5.3. State-Owned and Privately-Owned Plants in China
State-owned enterprises in China are believed to be less eﬃcient and operate diﬀerently
from privately-owned enterprises in terms of e.g., management, budgets, competition. The
regressions described in Section 4 for China include both privately-owned and publicly-owned
plants. However, it is possible that the relationship between international activities and the
demand for skilled labor is aﬀected by the type of ownership. We address this possibility as
follows. First, we add to Eq. (5) a dummy variable for collective plants and a dummy variable
for state-owned plants.47 The eﬀects of imported inputs and exports on the demand for skilled
labor are very similar in magnitude and signiﬁcance to those discussed in Section 4.48 For FDI,
however, the coeﬃcients lose signiﬁcance in some cases. The dummy variables for collective
plants and for state-owned plants have generally negative coeﬃcients, signiﬁcant for state-owned
plants. An important exception is veriﬁed when skill demand is measured by employment shares
of nonproduction workers: the coeﬃcients on the dummy variables for collective plants and for
state-owned plants are positive and signiﬁcant. Nonproduction workers include, among others,
administrative and services personnel, so we interpret this ﬁnding as reﬂecting some ineﬃciency
of publicly-owned plants which forces them to have a larger share of administrative workers.49
Second, we estimate Eq. (5) separately for privately-owned plants and for publicly-owned
(collective or state) plants. The eﬀects of imported inputs, exports and FDI on the demand for
skilled labor for privately-owned plants are relatively similar to those in Tables 5-12, whereas
the eﬀects for publicly-owned plants are also generally similar but often not signiﬁcant.50
47The Chinese sample is constituted by 646 privately-owned plants, 158 collective plants and 194 state-owned
plants.
48These results are available upon request.
49Note, however, that these workers’ wage bill shares in collective or state-owned plants are lower than in
privately-owned plants.
50This lack of signiﬁcance is likely due to the smaller sample size. However, interestingly, we ﬁnd that the positive
eﬀect of R&D on skill demand is often stronger for publicly-owned plants than for privately-owned plants.
245.4. Instrumental Variables
Our three international economic activities - imported inputs shares, export shares and FDI
shares - can arguably be considered endogenous in Eq. (5), due to the presence of reverse
causality. Thus, for example, foreign companies may choose to invest in plants that already
exhibit relatively higher shares of skilled workers, and both exports and imports of inputs may
be more likely to be pursued by plants whose workers possess higher educational levels, that
can be necessary to engage in contacts and negotiations with foreign customers or suppliers. To
address this problem, Tables 19-21 present results from estimating Eq. (5) using instrumental
variables (IV).51 In the case of imported inputs, the positive and negative eﬀects that were,
respectively, reported for Brazil and China in Section 4.1 are preserved, and the magnitude of
the coeﬃcients increases considerably (in absolute value). The speciﬁcation tests support the
endogeneity assumption for the share of imported inputs and the validity of the corresponding
instruments.
In the case of exports, the IV estimates validate the negative eﬀect previously found for
China in Section 4.2, but the IV estimates are not signiﬁcant for Brazil. In both countries, the
instruments for export shares seem to be appropriately correlated with that variable in the ﬁrst
stage regressions and tests for overidentifying restrictions also support their validity. However,
the ﬁrst speciﬁcation test reported in Table 20 suggests that in Brazil exports are not endogenous
in Eq. (5), so that our previous OLS estimates are preferred on eﬃciency grounds.
The eﬀects of FDI from IV estimation are still positive in Brazil, but they become negative
and signiﬁcant in four out of six cases in China. In those four cases, the speciﬁcation tests
support both the need for instrumental variables and the validity of the instruments adopted,
51Detailed lists of the instruments used are shown in the notes to Tables 19-21. They are based on industry-
region averages of some of the endogenous variables and, in China, on the fraction of plants that have been
restructured into shareholding companies and the average share of government-owned capital. In Brazil, we also
use industry-level tariﬀs, import penetration rates and export shares taken from Muendler (2003a) and Muendler
(2003b).
25thus suggesting that the positive eﬀect of FDI on the demand for skilled workers that was
previously obtained was the result of some endogeneity bias. In Brazil, the endogeneity of
FDI is not supported by the corresponding test, so the OLS estimates are preferred to the IV
estimates.
6. Conclusion
One of the most important beneﬁts that developing countries can potentially reap from their
increasing levels of integration in the world economy, besides the static gains associated with
increased international specialization, is the access to technologies developed in industrialized
countries. Indeed, the intrinsic diﬃculties associated with transferring technology through mar-
ket transactions make international trade and investment crucial channels for the international
diﬀusion of technology. Since most of the international income gaps are related to technology
and productivity gaps, increases in international economic integration are expected to go a long
way towards reducing the enormous inequalities existing between rich and poor countries.
B u tw h a ta b o u tt h ee ﬀects on the levels of inequality found within developing countries?
The evidence from research conducted for the U.S. and other industrialized countries suggests
that skilled-biased technological change has been the main factor driving increases in inequality
between skilled and unskilled workers. Thus, one could expect the same eﬀects in developing
countries, already characterized by high levels of inequality, as they increasingly adopt technolo-
gies developed in the industrialized world. However, as ﬁrms in developing countries expand
their international economic activities, one could also expect a greater exploitation of their coun-
tries’ comparative advantage in the production of goods that make intensive use of unskilled
labor. This should lead to a greater demand for that type of labor, and could thus counteract
the eﬀects that a greater adoption of skill-biased technologies could exert on local levels of wage
inequality.
26This paper investigates the relative weight of those two countervailing forces associated
with increased international integration, obtaining new evidence on the eﬀects of international
economic activities on plant-level demand for skilled workers. Our ﬁndings suggest that even
though in China the plants with international activities tend to pay higher relative wages to
skilled workers, the use of imported inputs, exports and FDI are all associated with a lower
demand for skilled labor. Thus, for Chinese plants engaged in some or all of these international
economic activities, specialization according to the country’s comparative advantage in goods
intensive in unskilled labor appears to more than compensate for the access to skill-biased
foreign technologies that is potentially associated with those activities. In Brazil, our results
also support a negative eﬀect of exports on skilled labor demand, but this eﬀect is restricted
to plants that export a majority of their output, as a positive eﬀect on skilled labor demand
is found for the remaining exporting plants. Moreover, in contrast to the evidence for China,
we ﬁnd that in Brazil both the use of imported inputs and FDI are linked to a greater demand
for skilled workers, probably because these activities act as channels for the diﬀusion of skilled-
biased technologies. All in all, it appears that there is no general answer to our initial question
concerning the eﬀects of increased levels of international integration on the relative demand
for skilled labor in developing countries: while the results for China suggest negative eﬀects,
those for Brazil tend to warrant an opposite conclusion. Understanding the factors and country
characteristics that underlie these diﬀerent sets of results is arguably a worthwhile endeavor,
which could be pursued to the extent that comparable plant-level data becomes available for a
larger sample of developing countries.
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Table 1. Economic Facts
Population 





























Brazil 175 2830 2.7 9.5 7.5 10.3 2.4 4.9
China 1281 950 9.0 23.3 16.0 20.9 4.6 6.4
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Table 2. Composition of the Samples 





Shoes and leather products 11%
Chemicals 5%






N. observations 1603 994
Panel B - Distribution of Plants across Size Categories
 Brazil China
Plants with less than 50 employees 53% 60%
Plants with 50 to 150 employees 28% 27%
Plants with more than 150 employees 19% 13%
Note: the definition of size is based on the total number of 
permanent employees at a plant.Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Panel A. Demand for Skilled Workers 
Avg. St.dev. Avg. St.dev. Avg. St.dev.
Wage bill shares of:
Nonproduction workers 0.32 0.18 0.31 0.006 0.46 0.24
Workers in engineering, technical and managerial 
occupations 0.22 0.15 0.22 0.005 0.39 0.23
Workers with some college 0.11 0.23
Employment shares of:
Nonproduction workers 0.22 0.14 0.22 0.005 0.38 0.24
Workers in engineering, technical and managerial 
occupations 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.003 0.28 0.21
Workers with some college 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.004 0.09 0.19
% of plants doing R&D
% of plants introducing new product lines
% of plants importing inputs
Avg. imported input share
% of plants exporting
Avg. export share 
% of plants with foreign ownership




















Note: For Brazil, the column labeled 'Brazil weighted' shows the summary statistics using survey weights. 
The averages of imported input shares, export shares, and foreign ownership shares are taken for, respecti- 







31Panel A. Brazil (using survey weights)











 R&D  0.05 *** 0.02 ** 0.04 *** New Product Lines
New Product Lines 0.05 *** 0.03 ** 0.03 ***
Use of Imported Materials 0.07 *** 0.06 *** 0.04 ***
Exports 0.08 *** 0.05 *** 0.04 ***
Foreign Ownership 0.22 *** 0.18 *** 0.11 ***
Panel B. China











 R&D  0.13 *** 0.12 *** 0.12 ***  
New Product Lines 0.09 *** 0.10 *** 0.09 ***
Use of Imported Materials -0.01 0.01 0.07 ***
Exports -0.06 *** -0.05 *** 0.00 0.36
Foreign Ownership 0.03 ** 0.05 *** 0.05 ***
Table 4. Differences in Average Wage Bill Shares of Skilled Workers According 
to Plants' Absorptive Capacity and International Economic Activities
Note: The asterisks show the results of tests of equivalence of mean wage bill
shares for plants that have "better" versus "worse" absorptive capacity and for
plants that are "more" versus "less" engaged in international economic activities.
* represents significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at
1%. 

















Brazil R&D 0.019 0.038 *** 0.003 0.019 *** 0.018 **
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008)
New product line  0.014 0.029 *** 0.004 0.014 ** 0.016 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
Imported inputs dummy 0.044 *** 0.024 ** 0.039 *** 0.014 ** 0.023 ***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009)
R squared 0.155 0.174 0.089 0.159 0.289
N. obs. 1377 1387 1377 1387 1385
China R&D 0.078 *** 0.062 *** 0.072 *** 0.048 *** 0.054 *** 0.042 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
New product line  0.022 0.020 0.034 ** 0.035 *** 0.018 0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016)
Imported inputs dummy -0.028 -0.060 *** -0.004 -0.023 * 0.023 0.001
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
R squared 0.279 0.281 0.308 0.347 0.329 0.325
N. obs. 899 902 899 902 899 902

















Brazil R&D 0.020 0.039 *** 0.004 0.020 *** 0.020 **
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008)
New product line  0.016 0.029 *** 0.005 0.014 ** 0.017 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
Imported inputs share 0.059 0.035 0.065 ** 0.037 ** 0.018
(0.037) (0.027) (0.031) (0.018) (0.016)
R squared 0.145 0.169 0.080 0.160 0.279
N. obs. 1377 1387 1377 1387 1385
China R&D 0.069 *** 0.050 *** 0.066 *** 0.041 *** 0.055 *** 0.043 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
New product line  0.022 0.020 0.033 ** 0.035 ** 0.019 0.021
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016)
Imported inputs share -0.107 *** -0.131 *** -0.064 ** -0.063 *** 0.015 0.005
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.022) (0.027) (0.023)
R squared 0.287 0.284 0.314 0.350 0.326 0.321
N. obs. 893 896 893 896 893 896
Notes: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
Notes: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.

















Brazil R&D 0.021 0.039 *** 0.004 0.020 *** 0.020 **
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008)
  New product line  0.015 0.030 *** 0.004 0.014 ** 0.017 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
Exports dummy 0.042 ** 0.001 0.051 *** 0.011 0.008
(0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010)
R squared 0.148 0.167 0.088 0.155 0.279
N. obs. 1377 1387 1377 1387 1385
China R&D 0.076 *** 0.060 *** 0.069 *** 0.046 *** 0.052 *** 0.040 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
New product line  0.024 0.024 0.034 ** 0.037 *** 0.017 0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016)
Exports dummy -0.047 *** -0.073 *** -0.038 ** -0.048 *** -0.016 -0.024 *
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013)
R squared 0.283 0.286 0.313 0.355 0.328 0.327
N. obs. 899 902 899 902 899 902

















Brazil R&D 0.021 0.038 *** 0.004 0.020 *** 0.020 **
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008)
  New product line  0.017 0.030 *** 0.006 0.014 ** 0.017 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
Exports share -0.028 -0.066 *** -0.010 -0.024 ** -0.014
(0.029) (0.018) (0.027) (0.011) (0.013)
R squared 0.142 0.171 0.073 0.155 0.278
N. obs. 1377 1387 1377 1387 1385
China R&D 0.058 *** 0.036 ** 0.058 *** 0.032 *** 0.042 *** 0.032 **
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
New product line  0.016 0.013 0.028 * 0.030 ** 0.013 0.016
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016)
Exports share -0.142 *** -0.191 *** -0.094 *** -0.109 *** -0.073 *** -0.068 ***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015)
R squared 0.311 0.332 0.325 0.373 0.337 0.337
N. obs. 899 902 899 902 899 902
Notes: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
Notes: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.

















Brazil R&D 0.022 * 0.040 *** 0.006 0.021 *** 0.020 **
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008)
  New product line  0.018 0.030 *** 0.007 0.015 ** 0.017 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
FDI dummy 0.124 *** 0.044 * 0.128 *** 0.053 *** 0.038 **
(0.035) (0.027) (0.030) (0.019) (0.018)
R squared 0.156 0.170 0.097 0.165 0.282
N. obs. 1377 1387 1377 1387 1385
China R&D 0.080 *** 0.064 *** 0.074 *** 0.050 *** 0.054 *** 0.043 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
New product line  0.025 0.023 0.036 ** 0.038 *** 0.018 0.021
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016)
FDI dummy 0.027 * -0.004 0.047 *** 0.028 ** 0.036 ** 0.022 *
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
R squared 0.279 0.270 0.317 0.349 0.332 0.327
N. obs. 899 902 899 902 899 902

















Brazil R&D 0.023 * 0.040 *** 0.007 0.021 *** 0.020 **
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008)
with weight New product line  0.017 0.030 *** 0.006 0.015 ** 0.017 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
FDI share 0.151 *** 0.054 * 0.146 *** 0.063 *** 0.047 **
(0.041) (0.033) (0.035) (0.024) (0.021)
R squared 0.158 0.1706 0.0959 0.166 0.283
N. obs. 1377 1387 1377 1387 1385
China R&D 0.081 *** 0.063 *** 0.075 *** 0.050 *** 0.055 *** 0.043 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
New product line  0.025 0.022 0.037 ** 0.038 *** 0.019 0.021
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016)
FDI share 0.035 -0.027 0.065 *** 0.032 0.049 ** 0.028
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.019)
R squared 0.278 0.271 0.315 0.347 0.331 0.326
N. obs. 899 902 899 902 899 902
Notes: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
Notes: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.


















Brazil R&D 0.020 0.038 *** 0.004 0.020 *** 0.019 **
(0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008)
New product line  0.014 0.029 *** 0.004 0.014 ** 0.016 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
Imported Inputs dummy 0.039 *** 0.023 ** 0.033 *** 0.012 * 0.021 **
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009)
Exports dummy 0.031 * -0.004 0.041 ** 0.007 0.004
(0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010)
FDI dummy 0.108 *** 0.040 0.112 *** 0.048 *** 0.033 *
(0.034) (0.027) (0.029) (0.019) (0.018)
R squared 0.172 0.176 0.118 0.171 0.292
N. obs. 1377 1387 1377 1387 1385
China R&D 0.077 *** 0.060 *** 0.071 *** 0.047 *** 0.053 *** 0.041 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
New product line  0.025 0.022 0.037 ** 0.038 *** 0.020 0.021
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016)
Imported Inputs dummy -0.020 -0.042 ** 0.000 -0.014 0.026 0.006
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015)
Exports dummy -0.048 *** -0.061 *** -0.050 *** -0.052 *** -0.033 * -0.032 **
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
FDI dummy 0.041 ** 0.018 0.057 *** 0.042 *** 0.037 ** 0.027 **
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012)
R squared 0.289 0.291 0.325 0.362 0.336 0.331
N. obs. 899 902 899 902 899 902
Note: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.


















Brazil R&D 0.022 * 0.039 *** 0.006 0.020 *** 0.020 **
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008)
New product line  0.016 0.029 *** 0.006 0.014 ** 0.017 ***
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
Imported inputs share 0.040 0.027 0.047 0.029 * 0.012
(0.034) (0.026) (0.029) (0.017) (0.016)
Exports share -0.052 * -0.076 *** -0.033 -0.034 *** -0.021
(0.026) (0.019) (0.026) (0.012) (0.014)
FDI share 0.150 *** 0.060 * 0.141 *** 0.063 *** 0.047 **
(0.041) (0.031) (0.034) (0.022) (0.020)
R squared 0.161 0.178 0.100 0.173 0.284
N. obs. 1377 1387 1377 1387 1385
China R&D 0.057 *** 0.032 ** 0.059 *** 0.032 *** 0.048 *** 0.035 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
New product line  0.020 0.014 0.033 ** 0.033 ** 0.018 0.020
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016)
Imported inputs share -0.051 -0.041 -0.033 -0.018 0.052 * 0.043 *
(0.032) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030) (0.025)
Exports share -0.144 *** -0.183 *** -0.103 *** -0.114 *** -0.100 *** -0.090 ***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.018)
FDI share 0.074 *** 0.016 0.094 *** 0.059 *** 0.059 ** 0.038 *
(0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020)
R squared 0.320 0.331 0.341 0.378 0.345 0.340
N. obs. 893 896 893 896 893 896
Note: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust 




















Brazil R&D -0.085 * 0.262 *** -0.112 * 0.206 *** 0.102
(0.050) (0.063) (0.058) (0.057) (0.089)
New product line  -0.165 *** 0.193 *** -0.139 ** 0.159 *** 0.113
(0.054) (0.065) (0.057) (0.059) (0.079)
Imported inputs share 0.201 * 0.195 0.227 * 0.276 * 0.458 **
(0.121) (0.168) (0.137) (0.143) (0.197)
R squared 0.111 0.189 0.179 0.230 0.162
N. obs. 1290 1385 1287 1387 1180
China R&D 0.005 0.333 *** 0.042 0.306 *** 0.006 0.474 ***
(0.042) (0.074) (0.038) (0.063) (0.070) (0.164)
New product line  0.006 0.040 -0.017 0.216 *** -0.062 0.101
(0.043) (0.073) (0.040) (0.071) (0.070) (0.174)
Imported inputs share 0.120 * -0.632 *** 0.156 ** -0.383 *** 0.060 0.192
(0.070) (0.141) (0.061) (0.131) (0.108) (0.356)
R squared 0.102 0.238 0.082 0.337 0.127 0.336
N. obs. 807 864 822 883 276 296




















Brazil R&D -0.078 0.256 *** -0.105 * 0.202 *** 0.107
(0.050) (0.063) (0.058) (0.057) (0.089)
New product line  -0.162 *** 0.194 *** -0.136 ** 0.161 *** 0.118
(0.055) (0.064) (0.057) (0.058) (0.079)
Exports share 0.271 * -0.405 *** 0.247 -0.337 ** -0.136
(0.148) (0.149) (0.186) (0.153) (0.167)
R squared 0.109 0.187 0.176 0.227 0.157
N. obs. 1290 1385 1287 1387 1180
China R&D 0.021 0.273 *** 0.045 0.252 *** 0.027 0.276 *
(0.042) (0.072) (0.038) (0.061) (0.071) (0.157)
New product line  0.016 0.002 -0.011 0.188 *** -0.063 0.101
(0.042) (0.070) (0.040) (0.068) (0.069) (0.170)
Exports share 0.211 *** -0.906 *** 0.159 *** -0.669 *** 0.186 * -1.046 ***
(0.056) (0.107) (0.053) (0.095) (0.097) (0.267)
R squared 0.114 0.288 0.086 0.369 0.138 0.375
N. obs. 812 870 827 889 279 299
Note: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
Note: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.




















Brazil R&D -0.081 0.269 *** -0.108 * 0.218 *** 0.119
(0.050) (0.063) (0.058) (0.057) (0.088)
New product line  -0.163 *** 0.196 *** -0.136 ** 0.163 *** 0.119
(0.055) (0.064) (0.057) (0.057) (0.078)
FDI share 0.200 0.338 ** 0.165 0.638 *** 0.560 ***
(0.131) (0.157) (0.169) (0.192) (0.187)
R squared 0.109 0.190 0.177   0.239 0.164
N. obs. 1290 1385 1287 1387 1180
China R&D 0.004 0.397 *** 0.033 0.358 *** 0.020 0.466 ***
(0.040) (0.073) (0.036) (0.061) (0.068) (0.161)
New product line  0.021 0.038 -0.005 0.230 *** -0.050 0.092
(0.043) (0.073) (0.040) (0.071) (0.068) (0.174)
FDI share 0.282 *** -0.251 ** 0.227 *** 0.113 0.243 ** 0.229
(0.067) (0.125) (0.059) (0.119) (0.107) (0.268)
R squared 0.123 0.227 0.094 0.331 0.144 0.340

















Brazil R&D 0.020 0.039 *** 0.004 0.020 *** 0.020 **
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008)
New product line  0.016 0.029 *** 0.005 0.014 ** 0.017 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
Imp. Inputs Share 0.060 0.033 0.069 ** 0.040 ** 0.013
(0.039) (0.029) (0.034) (0.020) (0.017)
Imp. I.* Comp. Adv. -0.011 0.020 -0.059 -0.046 0.063
(0.098) (0.076) (0.057) (0.033) (0.052)
R squared 0.145 0.169 0.081 0.161 0.280
N. obs. 1377 1387 1377 1387 1385
China R&D 0.069 *** 0.050 *** 0.066 *** 0.041 *** 0.055 *** 0.043 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
New product line  0.023 0.021 0.033 ** 0.035 *** 0.019 0.022
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016)
Imp. Inputs Share -0.047 -0.092 *** -0.015 -0.041 0.040 0.030
(0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.028) (0.040) (0.033)
Imp. I.* Comp. Adv. -0.122 *** -0.080 * -0.099 ** -0.045 -0.051 -0.051
(0.047) (0.044) (0.043) (0.037) (0.048) (0.040)
R squared 0.292 0.286 0.318 0.350 0.327 0.323
N. obs. 893 896 893 896 893 896
Notes: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
Table 15. Relative Wages, Relative Employment and Foreign Ownership Share 
Table 16. Skilled Labor Demand and Imported Inputs Share: Differential Effects in Industries with Comparative Advantage
Notes: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Comp. Adv. is a dummy 
















Brazil R&D 0.020 0.038 *** 0.004 0.020 *** 0.019 **
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008)
New product line  0.016 0.030 *** 0.005 0.014 ** 0.017 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
Exports share 0.027 -0.083 *** 0.042 -0.031 ** -0.006
(0.035) (0.021) (0.031) (0.015) (0.018)
Exports * Comp. Adv. -0.134 *** 0.043 -0.130 *** 0.018 -0.019
(0.046) (0.032) (0.044) (0.020) (0.024)
R squared 0.145 0.172 0.078 0.155 0.278
N. obs. 1377 1387 1377 1387 1385
China R&D 0.060 *** 0.037 ** 0.060 *** 0.033 *** 0.042 *** 0.032 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
New product line  0.016 0.013 0.029 * 0.031 ** 0.013 0.016
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016)
Exports share -0.098 *** -0.168 *** -0.043 -0.078 *** -0.060 ** -0.050 **
(0.033) (0.028) (0.031) (0.023) (0.029) (0.022)
Exports * Comp. Adv. -0.071 * -0.035 -0.081 ** -0.049 * -0.019 -0.027
(0.038) (0.032) (0.035) (0.027) (0.031) (0.023)
R squared 0.314 0.332 0.330 0.375 0.338 0.337
















Brazil R&D 0.023 * 0.040 *** 0.007 0.021 *** 0.020 **
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008)
New product line  0.017 0.030 *** 0.006 0.015 ** 0.017 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
FDI Share 0.143 *** 0.043 0.148 *** 0.059 * 0.038
(0.054) (0.042) (0.045) (0.031) (0.026)
FDI * Comp. Adv. 0.030 0.044 -0.009 0.016 0.034
(0.062) (0.052) (0.055) (0.038) (0.035)
R squared 0.158 0.171 0.096 0.166 0.283
N. obs. 1377 1387 1377 1387 1385
China R&D 0.081 *** 0.063 *** 0.076 *** 0.050 *** 0.056 *** 0.043 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
New product line  0.026 0.023 0.038 ** 0.039 *** 0.021 0.022
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016)
FDI Share 0.061 * -0.003 0.102 *** 0.051 ** 0.099 *** 0.057 **
(0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.024) (0.032) (0.023)
FDI * Comp. Adv. -0.044 -0.041 -0.065 -0.033 -0.087 ** -0.051
(0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.035) (0.043) (0.037)
R squared 0.279 0.272 0.318 0.348 0.335 0.328
N. obs. 899 902 899 902 899 902
Notes: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Comp. Adv. is a dummy variable for 
industries with revealed comparative advantage indexes larger than 1.
Table 18. Skilled Labor Demand and FDI Share: Differential Effects in Industries with Comparative Advantage
Notes: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Comp. Adv. is a dummy variable for 
industries with revealed comparative advantage indexes larger than 1.
Table 17. Skilled Labor Demand and Exports Share: Differential Effects in Industries with Comparative Advantage
















Brazil R&D 0.016 0.036 *** 0.000 0.018 ** 0.019 **
(0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009)
New product line  0.008 0.024 ** -0.002 0.011 0.016 ***
(0.018) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.006)
Imported inputs share 0.691 *** 0.356 *** 0.577 *** 0.279 *** 0.136
(0.180) (0.101) (0.163) (0.066) (0.096)
Endogeneity test: p.v.(a) 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.022 0.186
First stage F test: p.v.(b) 0.084 0.086 0.084 0.086 0.077
Hansen J test: p.v.(c) 0.985 0.684 0.661 0.616 0.581
N. obs. 1379 1389 1379 1389 1387
China R&D 0.050 *** 0.035 * 0.047 *** 0.025 * 0.042 ** 0.036 **
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014)
New product line  0.015 0.017 0.026 0.032 ** 0.014 0.019
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016)
Imported inputs share -0.301 *** -0.279 ** -0.255 ** -0.209 ** -0.126 -0.067
(0.116) (0.109) (0.106) (0.088) (0.104) (0.085)
Endogeneity test: p.v.(a) 0.067 0.141 0.046 0.073 0.146 0.373
First stage F test: p.v.(b) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J test: p.v.(c) 0.800 0.639 0.940 0.248 0.835 0.582
N. obs. 886 889 886 889 886 889
















Brazil R&D 0.018 0.040 *** 0.001 0.020 *** 0.022 **
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008)
New product line  0.017 0.029 *** 0.006 0.015 ** 0.018 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
Export share -0.161 0.051 -0.172 -0.002 0.098
(0.116) (0.095) (0.107) (0.060) (0.078)
Endogeneity test: p.v.(a) 0.231 0.187 0.104 0.704 0.127
First stage F test: p.v.(b) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J test: p.v.(c) 0.331 0.649 0.332 0.196 0.559
N. obs. 1379 1389 1379 1389 1387
China R&D 0.053 *** 0.039 ** 0.050 *** 0.031 ** 0.031 * 0.028 **
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014)
New product line  0.011 0.014 0.024 0.031 ** 0.007 0.014
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016)
Export share -0.188 *** -0.173 *** -0.154 *** -0.114 ** -0.156 ** -0.095 *
(0.064) (0.060) (0.059) (0.047) (0.063) (0.051)
Endogeneity test: p.v.(a) 0.499 0.757 0.327 0.938 0.156 0.572
First stage F test: p.v.(b) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J test: p.v.(c) 0.522 0.424 0.770 0.253 0.849 0.616
N. obs. 892 895 892 895 892 895
Notes: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. The imported input share is assumed endogenous. In Brazil, the
excluded instruments are industry-region average of foreign capital ownership, and industry export and import penetration rates. In China, the excluded
instruments are industry-region averages of intermediate inputs import shares, government capital ownership and the fraction of firms that have been
restructured into shareholding companies. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. (a) p. value of test of significance of
residual(s) of first stage regression(s) in original model. (b) p. value of test of joint significance of excluded instruments in first stage regression. (c) p. value of
Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions. 
Note: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. The export share is assumed endogenous. In Brazil, the excluded instruments
are the fraction of exporters per industry-region and industry tariff and import penetration rates. In China, the excluded instruments are industry-region
averages of export shares, government capital ownership and the fraction of firms that have been restructured into shareholding companies. * represents
significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. (a) p. value of test of significance of residual(s) of first stage regression(s) in original
model. (b) p. value of test of joint significance of excluded instruments in first stage regression. (c) p. value of Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions. 

















Brazil R&D 0.027 * 0.042 *** 0.008 0.023 *** 0.022 ***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008)
New product line  0.018 0.029 *** 0.007 0.015 *** 0.018 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005)
FDI share 0.364 *** 0.228 ** 0.258 ** 0.178 ** 0.121
(0.120) (0.099) (0.124) (0.071) (0.079)
Endogeneity test: p.v.(a) 0.117 0.109 0.390 0.114 0.278
First stage F test: p.v.(b) 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
Hansen J test: p.v.(c) 0.379 0.997 0.351 0.587 0.991
N. obs. 1379 1389 1379 1389 1387
China R&D 0.059 *** 0.040 ** 0.061 *** 0.031 ** 0.051 *** 0.039 ***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
New product line  0.002 0.001 0.022 0.023 0.014 0.016
(0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017)
FDI share -0.392 ** -0.444 *** -0.212 -0.292 ** -0.040 -0.056
(0.174) (0.170) (0.152) (0.136) (0.137) (0.117)
Endogeneity test: p.v.(a) 0.003 0.004 0.041 0.006 0.502 0.460
First stage F test: p.v.(b) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J test: p.v.(c) 0.746 0.646 0.792 0.333 0.886 0.636
N. obs. 892 895 892 895 892 895
Notes: All regressions include industry and region dummies and dummies for the level of education of the plant manager. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. The FDI share is assumed endogenous. In Brazil, the excluded
instruments are industry-region averages of export shares and foreign capital ownership, and industry tariff and import penetration rates. In China, the
excluded instruments are industry-region averages of foreign capital ownership, government capital ownership and the fraction of firms that have been
restructured into shareholding companies. * represents significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. (a) p. value of test of significance
of residual(s) of first stage regression(s) in original model. (b) p. value of test of joint significance of excluded instruments in first stage regression. (c) p.
value of Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions. 
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